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Abstract 
Co-decisions between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are increasingly 
adopted as early agreements. Recent EU studies have pinpointed how this informal turn in EU 
governance has altered the existing balance of power between EU actors and within EU institutions. 
However, the implications of accelerated EU decision-making are expected to have repercussions 
beyond the EU system and among other institutions impinge on the role of national parliaments. 
This study examines the implications of an alteration of EU political time on national parliaments’ 
ability to scrutinize their executives in EU affairs. A mixed method approach has been applied. This 
strategy combines survey data on national parliaments’ scrutiny process and response to early 
agreements for EU-26
1
 with case study examination of national parliaments in Denmark, United 
Kingdom and Germany. Theoretically, the burgeoning research agenda on EU time-scapes is 
applied. This study finds that the clock of national parliaments are out of time with the EU decision 
mode of early agreements which severely hampers their ability to scrutinize national governments. 
                                                          
1 All national chambers responded, except Spain.  
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Introduction 
As competences are transferred to the European Union (EU) and the ordinary legislative power of 
the European Parliament (EP) increases, national parliaments – once the main locus of 
democratic legitimacy – are fundamentally challenged. The scholarly literature has closely 
examined how national parliaments have adjusted to the European integration process. However, 
the literature is split in its estimation of the overall power of national parliaments in EU affairs. 
One branch of the literature reaches the conclusion that national parliaments are the main losers 
in the European integration process (Judge 1995; Rometsch & Wessels eds 1996; Katz & Wessels 
1999; Raunio 1999; Maurer & Wessels 2001; Wessels et al. 2003; Auel 2007). This branch relies on 
the so-called ‘deparliamentation thesis’, according to which the powers of national parliaments 
have been eroded by the shift of ever more policy areas to the EU; the increased use of 
supranational decision-making rules; and the opaque nature of EU decision-making (Ibid). 
The other branch of the literature argues that though national parliaments have responded 
slowly, they have steadily learned to play the European game (Raunio & Hix 2000; Duina and 
Oliver 2005; Auel & Benz eds 2007; O’Brennan & Raunio eds 2007). These scholars question the 
‘deparliamentation thesis’, arguing that the shift of power from legislators to executives is a 
general feature of European democracies in the post-war period (Raunio & Hix 2000; O’Brennan & 
Raunio eds 2007; Auel & Benz eds 2007). This current in the literature paints a more optimistic 
picture, where national parliaments have gradually claimed power back by institutionalising 
various mechanisms of parliamentary oversight (Ibid). Some scholars have even proposed that 
national parliaments have been strengthen by European integration, as it has opened doors for 
influence on new policy domains and facilitated cross-national learning (Duina & Oliver 2005). 
The jury is still out, however, as other scholars have rebutted the claim by pointing out the 
dominance of the executive branch in EU affairs (Goetz 2000; Wessels et al. 2003;  Raunio 2006; 
See also Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008 for an overview). 
Meanwhile the European decision-making process has undergone significant change, where 
formal institutional amendments have led to informal institutional turns producing early 
agreements between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council (Farrell and Hertier 2004). 
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The possibility to conclude co-decision already by its first reading was introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 in order to speed up inter-institutional decision-making. Early 
agreements, however, have implications beyond efficiency gains. Compromises are negotiated in 
informal settings and imply an additional level in the delegation chain of EU policy making, 
where the Council presidency and the rapporteur for the European Parliament become the 
entrusted negotiators (Shackleton & Raunio 2003; Farrel & Héritier 2004; Rasmussen & 
Shackleton 2005; Rasmussen 2011). Such turn towards greater informalization of the EU decision-
making process is likely to have considerable implications for national parliaments’ ability to 
scrutinize and influence EU affairs. By adding another level to the delegation chain, national 
parliaments face increased risk of information asymmetries and possible agency loss (Auel 2007). 
The research aim of this paper is to explore the implications of EU early agreements for national 
parliaments’ ability to scrutinize their executives’ decision-making in EU affairs. 
In order to follow this research aim, a mixed method approach will be used. Survey data on 
national parliaments’ scrutiny process and response to early agreements have been collected for 
EU-262 and combined with case study examination of national parliaments in Denmark, United 
Kingdom (UK) and Germany, comparing scrutiny grounds on a set of parameters. The paper first 
examines how decision-making has been accelerated in the EU and suggests more general 
implications. The burgeoning research agenda on EU timescapes is applied. The research design 
and data is then presented. Subsequently, the survey analysis on national parliaments and early 
agreements is conducted, followed by the three case studies. Finally some concluding remarks are 
provided.  
Out of time?: National Parliaments and Early Decision-making in 
the EU 
Early agreements demonstrate how the EU timescape, defined as ‘the manner in which political 
time in the EU is institutionalized along the dimensions of polity, politics and public policy’ 
(Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 325, for the research agenda on timescapes see in particular 
Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009; Goetz 2009; Meyer-Sahling and Goetz 2009), for decision-making 
has been profoundly changed during the last decade. The timescape of supranational governance 
                                                          
2 All national chambers responded, except Spain.  
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deeply affect the political time in the surrounding multi-level setting. Political time3 is a profound 
feature of national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize their governments’ in EU affairs, as the 
frequency and timing of scrutiny is essential to carry out this parliamentary task. Early 
agreements imply an acceleration of decisions (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 180) and highlight 
the importance of the temporal rules which govern political decision-making: 
“If we understand how ‘the EU ticks’, we will also gain insights into how it 
distributes opportunities for effective participation in decision-making” (Goetz 
and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 181).  
As will be demonstrated below, early agreements are significant to political time in the EU and 
have quite fundamentally changed not only the ‘basic rhythm’ (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 
206) but also the locus and actors of EU decision-making. By inquiring into contemporary 
political time in the EU, we will also inquire into the distribution of power, system performance 
and legitimacy.  
So far the study of EU timescapes has mainly concentrated on the EU level (Goetz and Meyer-
Sahling 2009; Goetz 2009; Meyer-Sahling and Goetz 2009), but this examination will demonstrate 
how time at the EU and national level have become increasingly desynchronized – with 
implications for the ‘dual legitimacy’ of EU politics (Benz 2004; Töller 2006).  
Accelerated decision-making; EU early agreements      
The Maastricht Treaty introduced the co-decision procedure in an attempt to democratise the 
EU, granting the EP co-equal legislator status within a defined set of policy areas (Shackleton & 
Raunio 2003). Since then, the co-decision procedure has been extended to an increasing number 
of policy areas. With the Lisbon Treaty, it has become the main legislative mode, now referred to 
as ‘the ordinary legislative procedure’.4 The increased involvement of the EP could potentially 
‘render European decision processes, already much too complicated and time-consuming, even 
more cumbersome’ (Scharpf 2010 (1994): 67). Despite such expectation, the co-decision procedure 
                                                          
3 As Goetz and Meyer-Sahling point out, “political time is intimately connected to power, system 
performance and legitimacy” and the way time is institutionalized is critical to the way a political 
system works (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 183). 
4 The Maastricht Treaty had 15 articles regulated according to co-decision. This increased to 38 
articles with the Amsterdam Treaty and to 44 articles with the Nice Treaty (Rasmussen & 
Shackleton 2005). The Lisbon Treaty means that 89 articles are now regulated according to the 
now called ‘ordinary legislative procedure’. 
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has proved to work efficiently (Maurer 2003). Efficiency has been secured by formal institutional 
amendments and ‘informal institutional turns in shared decision-making’ (Farrell & Héritier 2004: 
1209). The Amsterdam Treaty amended the co-decision procedure and hereby the temporal rules 
that governed decision-making and thus interaction. Since 1999, it has thus been possible to 
adopt proposals after the first reading in the EP and the Council (Rasmussen & Shackleton 2005). 
As Farrell and Héritier point out, this amendment of the co-decision procedure introduced an 
important innovation by means of ‘early agreements’, making it possible to fast-track proposals 
and avoid a second reading or conciliation (Farrell & Héritier 2004). Early agreements are made 
possible by informal trialogues in which key actors from the Council and the EP meet regularly 
and gradually form the contours of a compromise together with the Commission before formal 
political positions are taken by national ministers and MEPs. Scholars have pointed out these 
trialogues to have considerable implications for democratic legitimacy: 
“The trilogue is the biggest challenge to democratic legitimacy, for it centralises 
power in those actors who represents the Council and the Parliament in the 
trilogue” (Chalmers et. al. 2006: 155). 
The frequency of fast-tracked EU decision-making has increased considerable, as demonstrated in 
Figure 1:  
Figure 1: Number of cases under the Co-decision procedures concluded after:5 
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From being a procedure applied to technical and less controversial proposals (Farrell & Heritier 
2004: 1197), early agreements have grown to be the dominant decision mode of co-legislation and 
is increasingly applied to controversial and important proposals (House of Lords, 2008-09: 12). In 
the legislative year 2008-2009, 80 % of all co-decision dossiers were concluded at 1st reading. 
                                                          
5 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/concluded/index_en.htm.  
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Early agreements mean efficiency gains, but they also have considerable consequences for the 
legislative process and likely to have implications for the ‘dual legitimacy’ of EU decision making 
(Benz 2004; Töller 2006). The decision mode has decisive consequences for the EU institutions 
involved, implying de facto decisions being negotiated, detailed and prepared by a smaller set of 
key actors; the rapporteur and eventually shadow rapporteurs in the EP, the Council presidency 
and sometimes mediated by the Commission officials. As Farrell and Héritier point out, the 
decision mode clearly empowers a selected set of actors, allowing the EP rapporteur and the 
Council presidency to command their own sets of information, exchange views, build reciprocal 
trust and thus accelerate decision making (Farrell & Héritier 2004: 1200-1204).  
In order to conclude a dossier by its first reading, negotiations will begin as soon as the 
Commission has presented its proposal (Rasmussen 2011: 43). An informal trialogue meeting is 
held when the EP has appointed its rapporteur and the Council working group has had a first look 
at the text. This meeting will be followed by others, in which the representatives will report back 
to their institutions on the progression in the discussion. When the vote in the relevant 
parliamentary committee approaches, the representatives will begin to exchange compromise 
texts (Farrell and Hertier 2004: 1198). If the representatives can reach an informal compromise, 
the EP can include the Council’s position in its first reading amendments and the Council can 
later adopt the proposal as amended by the EP (Reh et. al. 2013 forthcoming). However, as the 
informal negotiations unfold and disagreements are gradually closed, it becomes increasingly 
difficult for the formal arenas such as Coreper or the parliamentary committee to reopen the 
negotiations as this will imply that all the prepared details are up in the air again. The final stage - 
where the compromise text is presented to the Council of Ministers and voted on in the plenary of 
the EP - will generally simply approve what has been put in place long time before.      
Over the years, the institutional familiarity with the co-decision procedure has increased and the 
European institutions have established more regular and better contact with one another 
(European Parliament report 2009: 11).  
“The trend to early agreements certainly plays an important role in the sense 
that early agreements require intensive inter-institutional contacts in the first 
place. The more the institutions then work together the more likely further early 
agreements become” (European Parliament report 2009: 27).  
The dense and early contact between the institutional representatives is foremost an informal 
one, which makes it difficult for the non-involved to size up how far negotiations have developed 
(ibid.). However, informal decision-making seems to be preferred by both legislators. The EP has 
greater ability to influence the compromise negotiated when put together in close contact with 
far fewer Council actors .The Council has its own motivations to prefer to close a deal early. In a 
Council with 27 member states it has become increasingly difficult to find a common position, 
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meaning that an early input from the EP may facilitate internal consensus-building in the Council 
(European Parliament report 2009: 11). Furthermore, the rotating Council presidencies are eager to 
close an early deal during their presidency, and seem “to favour 1st reading negotiations for which 
the arrangements are much more flexible than in later stages of the procedure” (European 
Parliament report 2009: 12).  
In sum, the modus operandi of early agreements is characterised by pace and delegation of 
mandates to negotiate to representatives. This means that much fewer actors are the de facto 
negotiators, trusted to strike a deal with the other co-legislator. Inter-institutional relations are 
characterised by much more regular, but also informal contact between the representatives. 
Moreover, the mutual dependence has grown between the institutions. Finally, a key aspect of the 
decision-mode is timing. The earlier negotiations set out, the more likely a successful and efficient 
outcome is. Early agreements are thus likely to affect key dimensions in contemporary EU affairs; 
power, performance and democratic legitimacy.  
Fast-tracked decision-making, unfolding between the few also have direct consequences for 
external actors, trying to influence and control EU policy making. The national parliaments are 
among these external actors. The informal contact and meetings in which decisions are prepared 
and negotiated are essentially secluded policy spaces to all other EU and national actors. 
Established checks and balances in EU multi-level governance to a large extent depends on that 
negotiations take place in a transparent and predictable way, where there is time to form opinions 
and access information to again pose the relevant questions as means of control. The changed EU 
timescape implies a need for national parliaments to adapt their scrutiny process.  
Research design and data  
This paper utilises a mixed-method strategy by combining survey data and three case studies 
(Lieberman 2005). The survey provides a descriptive chart on how national parliaments are 
involved in pre-legislation and early decision making, how they scrutinise, and the resources 
available for scrutiny. The data has been gathered via an online survey conducted in late 2009 and 
early 2010. The survey questions were derived from the existing corpus of literature; through 
reports compiled by the COSAC and on the basis of explorative interviews with parliamentarians 
and staff working in the field. Before the survey was officially sent out, it was tested on a group of 
people with expertise in data collection and/or parliamentary control. The survey was then sent 
via e-mails addressed personally to the academic secretary of the European Affairs Committees 
(EAC) in the respective national parliaments of the EU-27 using the COSAC network contact 
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information.6 In the vast majority of cases the academic secretary of the EAC is the respondent. A 
total of 39 surveys were sent out, 37 of which were answered. Up to four reminders were sent to 
those who had not yet replied to the survey, which increased the response rate significantly. Data 
were ultimately collected for all of the parliaments with the exception of the two chambers of the 
Spanish legislature. Where possible, the data were later validated against indices derived from the 
COSAC reports and existing studies (i.e. Raunio & Hix 2000; Maurer & Wessels 2001; Raunio 
2005). After triangulation, the data were processed in a descriptive manner by automatically 
grouping parliaments that had provided the same answers and then aggregating the frequencies.  
Based on the survey data we conducted three explorative cases studies on how the Danish, British 
and German parliaments scrutinise their respective governments. The three parliaments display 
considerable variation on the abovementioned dimension and they score differently in the 
scrutiny level assessment by Raunio; Denmark ranked highest, Germany in between and the UK 
ranked as a relatively weak scrutiny model (Raunio 2005: 335). Moreover, they are representatives 
of the ‘majoritarian’ and ‘consensual’ government configuration (Lijphart 1999; Auel & Benz eds 
2007) and because they represent different scrutiny systems (Sprungk 2010). The three 
parliaments are examined by applying ‘the method of structured-focused comparison’, where the 
three cases are studied and contrasted regarding the same parameters, examining the main 
remedy for scrutiny, number of cases examined, grounds for scrutiny, role of special committees, 
pre-legislation as well as involvement in early agreements (George & Bennett 2004: 67-72). Each 
case is comprehensively examined and compared by applying the process-tracing method, where 
a number of sources such as interviews conducted in 2009-2010 with key respondents7, i.e., 
parliamentary staff and individual members of the EACs, official reports for the EACs, and 
secondary literature are used and triangulated to obtain the most accurate picture possible 
                                                          
6 See http://www.cosac.eu/en/mailbox/parliaments/. 
7 Members of the European Affairs Committee in the Danish Parliament, August 2009; Policy 
advisers to the European Affairs Committee in the Danish Parliament, October 2009; Policy 
Analyst, EU Select Committee, House of Lords, September 2009; Chair, EU Select Committee, 
House of Lords, September 2009;  Clerk of the European Scrutiny Committee, House of Commons 
December 2009; Ministerialrätin, Bundesrat Büro des Ausschusses für Fragen der Europäischen 
Union February 2010,  Referentin im Sekretariat des Ausschusses für die Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union, Deutscher Bundestag, February 2010. 
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(George & Bennett 2004: 205-232). The mixed-method strategy thus aims to produce new insights 
into the status of parliamentary involvement and control in EU affairs.  
Early agreements: National parliaments left out? 
According to the survey data, most national parliaments are not involved in early agreements. For 
this reason, they have no information on and cannot control the drifts of the EU decision making 
taking place in this fast-track form. 
Figure 2: Parliamentary involvement early agreements8 
 
The chambers of parliaments which are labelled ‘not informed’ amounts to sixteen whereas three 
note that they are sometimes informed after agreements are made. Three chambers are informed 
before early agreements are closed but cannot give instructions. Seven parliaments note that they 
are involved in early agreements and can issue binding instructions on their governments. The 
remaining eight chambers of parliaments have answered ‘other’ in which they could elaborate 
their answers. The Estonian Riigikogu notes that the information flow depends on the sensitivity 
of the issue. The Danish Folketing is to be informed about all cases and can in principle instruct 
the government; in practice, however, information arrives too late and instructions are only given 
                                                          
8 Question 21 was formulated: ‘How is parliament involved in early agreements, i.e., first reading 
agreements between the European Parliament and the Council?’. The categories indicated in the 
figure were given as possible answers.  
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in a minority of cases. The Dutch Eerste Kamer and Slovenian Državni svet write that they are 
informed if they request such information. The Hungarian Országgyűlés writes that involvement 
depends on the cooperation with the government. In sum, these parliaments are not involved in 
early agreements on a systematic basis, which makes their ability to exert control conditional. The 
Latvian Saeima, on the other hand, notes that if the EAC has already approved a national position 
but early agreements imply changes or shifts in national positions, the government is obliged to 
receive a new mandate.9 Finally, the Swedish Riksdag has responded ‘other’. Its response appears 
to encapsulate some of the main challenges to parliamentary scrutiny when decision making is 
fast-tracked:  
‘The co-decision procedure poses difficulties from the point of view of 
parliamentary scrutiny. In its practical application, the procedure is lacking in 
transparency, and any “real” negotiations are only as an exception taking place 
when the proposal is on the table at Council meetings. These difficulties are 
particularly pronounced in the case of deals being struck in the early stages of 
the procedure, when the content of the deal has been negotiated in informal 
trialogues with no “natural” points at which to apply parliamentary scrutiny’ 
(survey, answer to question 21).  
In a secluded actor space, national parliamentarians represent a set of actors which are left out. 
The decision mode is characterised by its own flow, whereas parliamentary scrutiny requires a 
temporal ‘stand still’, allowing control to be exerted. Informal contact and trialogues between the 
mandated representatives leave no ‘natural’ point of intervention for national parliaments. In the 
informal trialogue setting, the emerging consensus between the Council presidency and EP 
representatives renders the state of flux even more pronounced. The original Commission 
proposal which the national parliaments face may no longer be the relevant text, but de facto 
negotiations are likely to proceed on the basis of a significantly different text (House of Lords 
2008-09: 16). As concluded by the House of Lords, informal trialogues and rapid decision making 
render parliamentary scrutiny ‘very difficult’ due to a lack of transparency and the fact that the 
Council presidency appears to hold the upper hand in this decision mode and ‘hold its cards close 
to its chest’ (Ibid). 
A call for early involvement. Accelerating national scrutiny?   
Early decision making calls for the earlier involvement of national parliaments. As noted in the 
survey, ‘“real” negotiations are an exception once the proposal is on the table at Council meetings’ 
(Survey data, answer to question 21). The ministerial level tends to approve what has already been 
                                                          
9 The Belgian House of Representatives has not answered this question.  
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agreed upon (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 2006; Häge 2007). The survey data substantiates that the 
majority of the national parliaments issue binding instructions to their respective governments in 
EU matters in the late stage of decision making. In other words, instructions are given at the 
ministerial level immediately before agreements are adopted in the Council.  
Figure 3:10 Instruction level 
 
Nine chambers are not able to issue instructions at all. Seventeen chambers give instructions at 
the level of the Minister. Five chambers note that they provide instructions when negotiations 
start in the relevant Council working group or at the Coreper level. Six chambers state that they 
provide instructions at all levels depending on the character of the dossier. Not only are national 
parliaments latecomers in the control of policy making in the decision mode in early agreements, 
but when instructions fall at the minister level, before the Council meeting, it appears to be too 
late to exert scrutiny with the executive. Real deals are made much earlier. The increased use of 
early agreements suggests that the working group is a more relevant instruction level.  
This development also suggests that in order to be able to respond adequately at the earliest stage 
in the decision-making process, national parliaments would need to gain information before the 
Commission presents its proposal. This means that agenda-setting becomes an increasingly 
relevant part of the policy process for all actors seeking to influence or control the flow of EU 
affairs (Börzel 2002, 2005; Wallace 2005).  
                                                          
10 Question 11 was formulated: ‘At what level in the EU decision-making process does the 
instruction generally take place?’ The question only addresses the parliaments that are able to 
issue binding instructions on their governments. The categories indicated in the figure were given 
as possible answers. 
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The survey data demonstrate how national parliaments inform themselves regarding the 
Commission’s Green and White Papers in the policy design phase. Some parliaments also 
scrutinise early position papers from their governments. Only the Belgian Chambre des 
Représentants, the Hungarian Országgyűlés, the Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati, the Polish Sejm, the 
Polish Senate and the Slovakian Národná rada note that they are not involved in the policy design 
phase.  
Figure 4:11 Parliament involvement in the policy design phase 
 
Such pre-legislative involvement prepares the national parliaments to some extent as to what may 
come. However, early agreements are likely to disorient the actors in the policy design phase, 
since Green and White Papers may at best weakly indicate how negotiations will proceed. Pre-
legislative involvement does not tackle the state of flux of early agreements which challenge the 
ability of parliaments to control and scrutinise what is essentially a fast-moving target.  
We will now turn to the case studies of Denmark, the UK and Germany in order to inquire further 
into how their national parliaments have organised their scrutiny process and – eventually – 
adapted to the new timescape characterizing EU decision-making.  
                                                          
11 Question 16 was formulated: ‘Is the parliament involved in the pre-legislation phase?’ The 
categories indicated in the figure were given as possible answers. 
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Parliamentary scrutiny and early agreements: Denmark 
Denmark is often held to be the member state in which the national parliament has the greatest 
power in EU affairs and been consider the ‘scrutiny leader’ (Raunio 2007; Holzhacker & Albæk eds 
2007: 147-148; Sprungk 2010). The centre of gravity in the parliamentary control with the 
government in EU affairs is the European Affairs Committee (EAC). The Danish control system is 
a procedural system focusing on the government position in the Council and giving direct 
mandates (COSAC 2007). According to the procedure, the government must present a position 
paper in cases of considerable impact and must inform the committee about important cases 
(Market Committee 1974). The government however presents position papers on most cases and 
get this accepted by the EAC in approximately 90-95 per cent of the cases due to the 
comprehensive consultation of affected interest beforehand and the anticipation of the mandate 
allocation (Jensen 2003: 156). On the Friday before the Council meeting, the relevant minister will 
go to the EAC and make an oral presentation of the proposed negotiation position. The position is 
approved (mandated) unless members of the EAC representing 90 mandates or more explicitly 
express that they are against (Damgaard & Jensen 2006).   
A recurring demand from the EAC has been a request for more detailed information and the need 
for consultation earlier in the negotiation process (Esmark 2002; Sousa 2008; Jensen 2011). It has, 
however, proven difficult to institutionalize a work-mode to its realization and early agreements 
thus pose significant challenges to the Danish model. Early agreements imply that giving a 
mandate at the Minister level, is one stage far too late. It would be reasonable to give the mandate 
at the Coreper level or better yet to give the mandate at the working group level in the Council – 
and to renew such mandates when informal negotiations produce new positions. At the 
ministerial level, it is almost impossible to alter an agreement between the Council and EP in 
cases where the Danish government fails to obtain its mandate.  
It has also been pointed out that although early positions are formulated in the government, they 
are not systematically presented to the parliament (Interview I). In some situations, the 
government holds that the establishment of compromise involving trialogues prior to the first 
reading in the EP is a delicate and rather confidential process which renders the presentation of 
positions impossible (Interview IV). In other situations, the government may not have sufficient 
information itself from the Council presidency (Interview VII). The EAC members have noted that 
first reading agreements are an increasing problem for parliamentary control, since the 
information provided by the government to the Parliament is too little, too late – often after 
Coreper has mandated the Presidency (COSAC 2009, Annex: 30; Interview VII). At this stage, the 
Danish government as a Council member has already given the Presidency a mandate to 
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negotiate, without any mandate from the Danish parliament. This development severely 
challenges the ability of the parliament to de facto control the government.  
As early as March 2006, the former president of the EAC pointed out that early agreements had 
outdated the Danish (late) mandating system (Auken 2006). In light of fast-track policy making, 
he suggested that parliamentary mandates should be given much earlier. This was followed by an 
official request from the European Affairs Committee to the government to present its position as 
early as possible (EAC, Beretning, 23 June 2006). The government responded by noting that in 
cases of early agreement, it would aim to present its position before Coreper mandates the 
presidency to negotiate (Danish Foreign Ministry 2006). Ideally, this would mean that the 
government would request its mandate from the EAC when the presidency asks for a mandate 
from Coreper to initiate negotiations in the lst trialogue. However, in reality the government 
appears to request its mandate when the presidency asks Coreper for a mandate to close a deal 
with the EP (Interview VII). Issuing a mandate in the late phase of Coreper negotiations stands 
out as another stage too late, since negotiations between Council representatives must have 
begun far earlier in order to reach a common position in the Council. To take part in such 
negotiations, the individual governments must have formed their positions at an earlier stage, 
presumably when the relevant working group starts to act. Furthermore, the government 
response does not consider the flow of fast-track decision making and does not guarantee that it 
will return to the EAC when positions change during negotiations. However, not even the 
government may have sufficient information to present, as it may be far from fully informed itself 
regarding the progress in trialogues.  
Finally, the Danish European Affairs Committee is not very engaged in the preparatory stages of 
EU policy-making. The involvement of the EAC is limited when it comes to influencing the 
European Commission on a more direct, concrete level by uploading own regulatory models or 
attempting to shape proposals which are in the pipeline (Survey question 16). The general view 
seems to be that actions taken by ministers before proposals are officially launched by the 
European Commission fall within the jurisdiction of the government (Interviews I, II, III).  
Parliamentary scrutiny and early agreements: United Kingdom  
In contrast to Denmark, the British parliamentary scrutiny system is not mandating the minister 
before agreements can be made in the Council (Survey question 10). The British system is the 
classical example of a document-based system (COSAC 2007) in which EU documents are sifted 
through at the early stage of the decision-making process. The model has by some scholars been 
found to have a low level of scrutiny (see for example the scoreboard of Raunio 2005: 335) and by 
others to actually carry out quite detailed parliamentary scrutiny (Auel 2007: 501-502).  
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As such, the British scrutiny system does not control the executive in a strict sense, instead 
examining the content and impact of proposals through scrutiny. This form of parliamentary 
scrutiny is divided between the House of Commons and House of Lords. The two chambers have 
each established a European Affairs Committee (EAC) responsible for holding the government 
accountable. The main mechanism is the so-called scrutiny reserve which implies that the 
government is not allowed to give consent to EU cases which the two houses have not yet 
examined or are still examining (Hazell & Paun 2006: 5; Cygan 2007: 172-173). The government 
must await the clearance of the scrutiny reserve before taking action. 
Beginning with the House of Commons, which is the elected body of the two chambers, its 
European Scrutiny Committee processes more than 1000 documents annually (House of 
Commons 2008). According to the rules of procedure, the government must submit documents 
from the Commission within two days of receiving them (Cygan 2007: 165-169). The government 
must then submit a so-called explanatory memorandum within two weeks with a description of 
the proposal and its implication (Ibid). Based on this information, the committee will decide 
whether the document is politically and/or legally significant (Interview VI). All documents 
deemed politically and/or legally important are reported on at length in the Committee's weekly 
Reports. The Committee also has the power to recommend documents for debates, which take 
place in a European Committee or (more rarely) on the Floor of the House. Under the scrutiny 
reserve resolution passed by the House, Ministers should not vote in the Council of Ministers on 
proposals which the Committee has not cleared or which are awaiting debate. Moreover, the 
committee may refer documents to departmental select committees, though the most common 
option is to refer the documents to one of the sub-committees on EU affairs. As the House of 
Commons apply a document based scrutiny system, the earliest stage at which it gets activated is 
when the Commission launch a Green or White paper (Survey question 16). However, the system 
is not animated before a formal proposal is placed on the table. The House of Commons should 
be informed before an early agreement is reached but it not in a position to instruct (Survey 
question 21).Initially, the House of Commons assumed that contentions proposals would not be 
subject to early agreements (Interview VI). This assumption, has however, been challenged as first 
reading agreements is prevalent and also used on proposals which are politically salient (Ibid.). 
Early agreements thus challenge the scrutiny system due to the fast speed and the opaque nature 
of the decision mode which makes it difficult to apply the scrutiny reserve. The House of 
Commons have informed the government about the difficulty but no concrete measures have 
been installed to better synchronize the European and the national timescape (Ibid.). 
The House of Lords, which is the unelected, second chamber of the UK parliament, exercises 
control via its EU Committee. Every week, the committee chair and legal adviser sift through all 
of the documents which the government has deposed (Interview V). Approximately half of the 
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cases of a routine nature are cleared by the committee chair, meaning that the government can go 
ahead and decide on them. The other dossiers, which raise political or legal questions, are 
allocated to one of the seven sub-committees under the select committee. The subcommittees 
meet weekly, where a background note will be prepared for each case by a committee clerk (Ibid). 
Committee clerks will also prepare a draft letter for the minister if something must be clarified 
before the committee can lift the scrutiny reserve. Based on the information provided by the 
minister, the committee will decide whether to clear the proposal or to investigate further by 
inviting the minister to provide evidence before the committee (Cygan 2007: 169-171). Before the 
minister arrives at the session, committee clerks and specialists will have prepared a number of 
questions, which are divided between the members. In cases of greater significance, the 
committee will produce a report. In the 2007-2008 session, for example, the sub-committees 
produced reports on fourteen topics, including the Lisbon Treaty, the EU and Russia, and organ 
donation (House of Lords, Annual Report 2008). In comparison with the House of Commons, 
many members of the House of Lords European Union Committee has considerable expertise in 
EU matters, as they have held high positions such as Commissioner, Coreper ambassadorships 
and EP presidency in the course of their professional lives (Interview V).  
The extended use of early agreements and the informal trialogues have caused considerable 
concern in the House of Lords as to how to respond to these challenges in order to hold the 
government accountable. These concerns are raised in one of the House of Lords’ reports, dealing 
exclusively with co-decisions and national parliamentary scrutiny (House of Lords report on the 
co-decision procedure and national parliamentary scrutiny 2008). In order to deal with the 
challenges implied by co-decisions and early agreements, the EU Committee suggests adjusting 
the existing systems of parliamentary scrutiny in a number of ways (Ibid.). First, it suggests that 
the government must update the parliament without any delay when there have been changes in 
the proposal with policy implications. Second, it is suggested that the House of Lords office in 
Brussels should be allowed access to documents being negotiated under the co-decision 
procedure in the Permanent British Representation in order to maintain a fast track with how the 
negotiations evolve. Third, the British government is expected in the future to send documents 
from the Council which are marked LIMITE. Fourth, the importance of the above-mentioned 
need for sending reports to MEPs who are involved in cases negotiated under the co-decision 
procedure is emphasised together with the need to inform other national parliaments via a 
common database. Despite these explicit recommendations from the House, the amendments 
have so far not been effectuated (Interview X).    
The two Houses are different as to how scrutiny is exercised. The House of Lords carries out in-
depth enquiries early in the decision-making phase of a limited number of key cases, whereas the 
House of Commons produces a weekly report summarising the background notes of all of the 
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proposals under scrutiny. The established division of labour between the houses and their 
respective manners of EU dedication mean that Parliamentary EU control is tackled from 
different angles and forums. The document-based system may therefore contain different ways of 
tackling new challenges to parliamentary scrutiny that the mandating system has not (yet) fully 
developed.  
Parliamentary scrutiny and early agreements: Germany  
Like the British system, and in contrast to the Danish system, the German system is a document 
based system in which proposals from the EU institutions are singled out for scrutiny (COSAC 
2007: 15). The German Parliament has been criticized for not making full use of its formal rights 
to scrutinize the government and thus to perform relatively weakly compared to other models 
(Auel 2007: 493; Töller 2004; 2006; Sprungk 2010).  
The Committee on the Affairs of the European Union (Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union), also called the EU Committee, is the hub of coordination in the Bundestag. 
The committee is responsible for cases concerning European integration, whereas the specialised 
committees are responsible for scrutinizing sector specific proposals from the EU. All documents 
from the government go through the EU Committee, which is allocating them to relevant 
committees (Interview VIII). The transmitted documents have attached forwarding letters with 
information on the main substance, the legal basis, the applicable procedure and the leading 
federal ministry (EUZBBG section 5). A special administrative unit under the auspices of the EU 
committee called PA1 (Europa Referat) sifts the documents and suggests a prioritisation to the 
parliamentary groups (Interview VIII).  
The prioritised dossiers will then together with the political groups be allocated to the special 
committee(s) of the Bundestag which the case concerns. The responsible committee(s) will make 
use of questions to the government, together with written reports, as the basis for its scrutiny 
before crafting a resolution. The EU Committee can suggest amendments or adjust the resolution 
from the lead committee before transmitting it to the plenary (Rules of Procedure: Rule 93b (7)). 
Based on the resolution the plenary adopts a motion, which the federal government must follow 
in the Council of Ministers (EUZBBG section 9). However, the government can deviate from that 
motion for compelling reasons, in which case it will have to appear before relevant committee in 
the Bundestag to explain the reasons for the deviation (Survey question 10; Linn & Sobolewski 
2010: 59-62).  
On 28 September 2006, the Bundestag made an agreement with the government that tightens the 
procedural demands. This agreement was adjusted on 30 September 2009 to accommodate the 30 
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June 2009 ruling from the German Federal Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) which found the role 
of the two chambers of parliament to be insufficient to counteract the transfer of power to the 
European level. This implied that the agreement governing the relationship between the 
parliament and the government was changed, most significantly by making it legally binding 
(Beichelt 2010: 6-8). The adjusted cooperation law also stresses the importance of subsidiary 
check, according to which the Bundestag should consider within eight weeks whether or not a 
case fulfils the principle following the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Despite the empowering of the Bundestag following the ruling from the Constitutional Court, the 
parliament has severe problems dealing with early agreements. There is no advanced system in 
place in the Bundestag which can keep up with fast speed legislation at the European level and 
the chamber is only informed sometimes after an agreements are made (Interview VIII; survey 
question 21). The Bundestag only receives non-papers (i.e. informal and nonbinding papers) 
regarding early agreement, if it receives any information at all from the government (survey 
question 16). This makes it extremely difficult for the Bundestag to monitor and control what is 
happening and in the vast majority of cases the government is not held accountable.  
The government is obliged to inform the Bundesrat about new dossiers emanating from the EU as 
early as possible. Upon receipt, the EU Secretariat of the Bundesrat shifts the proposals and 
decides on which to scrutinize (Interview IX). On average, 100 to 150 documents are preselected 
for inspection per year. Based on the preselection process, the Secretary General on behalf of the 
President of the Bundesrat allocates the proposals to relevant sector committee(s). The sector 
committees then scrutinize the proposals and give statement to the Committee on European 
Union Questions (EU Committee) (Ausschuss für Fragen der Europäischen Union). The federal 
government will appear before both the sector committees and the EU Committee to engage in 
dialog. Founded on the views given by the relevant sector committees, the EU Committee 
deliberates the proposal. It is the EU Committee that is competent to decide whether or not to 
support the views from the sector committees.  
After the deliberation, a report is produced and sent to the plenary for a decisive vote. A Chamber 
for European Affairs (Europakammer) exists in the Bundesrat according to Article 52 (3a) of the 
Basic Law, which mirrors the composition of the plenary and may take a decision on behalf of it 
in cases that are either pressing or classified. The Bundesrat comments on Green and White 
Papers (survey question 16). As for early agreements the Bunderat is even more challenged than 
the Bundestag because it is not informed and there is no infrastructure in place which is 
synchronised with the fast track decision making at the European level (Interview IX; survey 
question 21). 
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Conclusion 
Co-decision is now the ordinary legislative mode in a European Union enlarged to 27 member 
states. Scholars have noted that neither the increased powers of the EP, nor enlargement have 
slowed down supranational decision-making, which seems to operate according to ‘business as 
usual’ (Wallace 2007; Meyer-Sahling and Goetz 2009: 329). This is, however, not the case. The 
accelerated and growing informalization of decision-making has wide implications beyond time-
estimated performance. Performance by means of efficiency may be largely intact, but the 
distribution of power and democratic legitimacy are not. The analysis in this paper has 
demonstrated how EU early agreements have considerable implications for national parliaments’ 
ability to scrutinize their executives.  
EU decision-making and the national scrutiny hereof operate in many cases according to 
different, desynchronized timescapes. It has been pointed out that ‘EU institutions do not run the 
same clock’ (Goetz 2009: 210), but even less so is the political time shared with national political 
systems. The changes in the decision-mode upset national models of parliamentary scrutiny as 
they were institutionalized at a very different point in political time, where member states were 
fewer, the EP had much less power and decisions were normally taken on basis of consensus. 
National executives were thus more directly responsible for their EU actions, whereas today many 
decisions are prepared and de facto taken on behalf of the large majority of national executives. 
The minister may not be very well informed, now represented by the rotating presidency, acting 
on behalf of issued mandates to keep the pace of complex decision-making and close a deal as 
early as possible. The degree of closure in the informal setting may essentially sideline the object 
of control itself, i.e., the government.  
The three case-studies point out that none of the scrutiny models are at pace with the accelerated 
EU decision-making. Nevertheless, important differences are evident, which may better enable 
the House of Lords in the UK system to tackle the increased need for early action. When 
comparing the scrutiny process on different parameters, the House of Lords stands out as the 
more pro-active chamber:  
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Table 1: Comparing parliamentary scrutiny 
Country Denmark  United Kingdom Germany 
Parliament Folketinget Commons  Lords  Bundestag Bundesrat 
Main remedy Mandating 
procedure: 
Government 
must present a 
position paper 
which there 
cannot be an 
expressed 
majority against  
Document-based procedure: Government 
must not take action in the EU before the 
two chambers have scrutinised a proposal, 
i.e., the scrutiny reserve 
Document-based procedure: The 
Government must notify the parliament 
comprehensively and as early as possible. 
If necessary the government should apply 
the scrutiny reserve to allow time for 
the parliament to deliberate the proposal 
and issue an opinion, 
Number of 
cases 
examined  
Most cases are 
examined  
Most cases are 
examined  
A selected number 
of cases are 
examined  
Most cases are 
examined 
Some cases are 
examined 
Grounds for 
scrutiny 
On the basis of 
basic, topical and 
summary notes 
formulated by 
the government 
On the basis of 
explanatory 
memorandum 
formulated by 
government 
On the basis of 
background note 
and possible reports 
formulated by the 
House of Lords  
Notes produces by 
the government  
Notes produced 
by the government  
Special 
committees  
Special 
committees 
sometimes 
involved  
Departmental 
committees 
sometimes involved  
Special EU 
subcommittees 
highly involved  
 
Sector 
Committees highly 
involved  
Sector 
Committees highly 
involved 
Pre-legislation EAC may 
examine green 
and white papers 
EAC examines 
green and white 
papers 
Subcommittees 
conduct enquiries, 
summarised in 
reports to the 
Commission. Also 
increasingly sending 
own reports to the 
EP 
Commenting on 
green and 
whitepapers  
Commenting on 
green and white 
papers 
Early 
agreements  
No systematic 
information on 
early 
governmental 
position. 
Information given 
to parliament at 
times after 
COREPER has 
mandated the 
presidency to 
negotiate and the 
Danish 
government thus 
de facto has 
committed itself 
to a position  
May be informed, 
but cannot give 
instructions. Not 
necessarily updated 
when negotiation 
positions change. 
Do not have access 
to all relevant 
documents.  
May be informed, 
but cannot give 
instructions. Not 
necessarily updated 
when negotiation 
positions change. Do 
not have access to 
all relevant 
documents.  
Arbitrary scrutiny 
of position papers   
No involvement in 
regard to early 
agreements  
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The Lords treat a limited, selected number of cases but subsequently invest significantly greater 
resources in the scrutiny process and carry out much more detailed examination. Furthermore, 
their grounds for scrutiny do not depend on explanatory memorandums or summary notes from 
the government, operating instead on the basis of their own reports or notes worked out by their 
own employees. Thus, the independent analytical capacity is higher. Moreover, the high 
involvement of special committees enhances the scrutiny capacity of the House of Lords. The 
Lords proactively attempt to influence both the Commission and the EP by scrutinising 
developments and initiatives and sending their own reports to the agenda-setters in the 
Commission and the decision makers in the EP, among these the powerful rapporteurs. In this 
manner, the House of Lords appears to have adapted to the increased need for early action in the 
EU policy cycle. In contrast the EAC in Denmark continues to concentrate on the late stage of 
decision making where a mandate is given to the minister. Although Denmark is renowned for its 
strong model of parliamentary control, it lags behind in its efforts to adapt to the new temporal 
rules of EU decision-making. Germany as well has not yet accelerated its national scrutiny, and 
experience a lack of information on position formation in the informal trialogues. So far no 
infrastructure has been put in place which is synchronised with fast track decision making at the 
European level.  
This paper has examined the implications of early agreements in EU decision-making for the 
national legislators’ ability to scrutinize their executives. The temporal rules that govern EU 
politics have changed (Goetz 2009), but many national clocks have far from adapted and are out 
of time. Whereas the performance of the system may be intact, the implications for power and 
democratic legitimacy stand out. Concerning the distribution of power, these findings gives 
evidence to ‘de-parliamentation thesis’. More than half of the national legislator has lost power, 
but this time not to the executive (Goetz 2000; Wessels et al. 2003; Raunio 2006), but instead to 
the few actors of delegated responsibility. Concerning democratic legitimacy, the findings suggest 
that the ‘dual legitimacy’ of EU politics (Benz 2004; Töller 2006) is more challenged than often 
assumed.  
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